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Sargent and Wallace (1981) are widely regarded to have 
demonstrated that monetary policy cannot be manipulated 
independently (exogenously) when the growth path of 
government expenditures and the tax structure are both 
fixed. More succinctly, Sargent and Wallace maintain that 
the only choice available to the central bank is not whether 
to monetize a government deficit but when—now or later. 
This result can be viewed as a generalization of the Blinder 
and Solow (1973, 1974), Tobin and Buiter (1976), and 
Steindl (1974) analyses of the stationary state when it is 
assumed that the monetary base is increased while govern-
ment spending and the tax rate are fixed, so that govern-
ment borrowing is adjusted passively via open market 
operations.
1 Although Sargent and Wallace's argument 
appears persuasive to such authors as King and Plosser 
(1983), I believe it is seriously wrong as a guide to 
understanding monetary policy in the United States. To 
prove my point, this paper first demonstrates that whether 
or not the government can independently manipulate 
money, spending, and taxes is not a theoretical question. 
Then I present evidence that, at least in the United States, 
the government can indeed independently manipulate all 
three instruments, with government debt adjusting in a 
passive but stable manner. 
Pleasant Arithmetic Reverses a Key 
Sargent-Wallace Assumption 
Miller (1983) has derived a version of the government 
budget constraint which is useful for studying the long-
run growth equilibrium of the economy. Simplifying the 
notation of Miller's equation (6), we can rewrite this 
constraint as 
(1) G-T= iAM + (8-r)D 
where the following are expressed as ratios to net national 
product (NNP), 
G = government expenditures 
(excluding interest payments and taxes thereon) 
T = government tax receipts 
M= the monetary base 
D = the stock of government debt 
and where the following are rates per unit of time, 
/x = the growth of the monetary base 
8 = the growth of real government debt 
r = the real after-tax interest rate.
2 
The constraint states that the excess of spending over taxes 
must be financed either by base money creation or by 
borrowing in excess of the amount needed to pay the real 
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1 This paper does not attempt to comment on the relevance of the balanced-
budget condition within the stationary state. See, however, Fischer 1976 and 
Auerbach and Rutner 1977 on this point. 
2See Darby 1975. Further discussion of the use of the after-tax real yield 
appears later in this paper. 
15 after-tax interest on the government debt.
3 
The question raised by Sargent and Wallace's article is 
whether only one value of money-creation revenue juM 
exists for which debt will be a stable fraction of NNP.
4 
This question can be formalized by asking whether a 
steady-state equilibrium exists and is stable for alternative 
valuesof julM. The steady-state equilibrium debt-to-NNP 
ratio D is found from equation (1) to be 
(2) D = (G-T-fiM)/(y~r) 
where 
y = the growth rate of real NNP 
and 
y = S if the debt-to-NNP ratio D is constant. 
Equation (2) says that if the government is spending more 
than it collects in explicit taxes and the inflation tax, there 
can still be a constant debt-to-NNP ratio if the real NNP 
growth rate y exceeds the real after-tax interest rate r. 
However, if r exceeds y, then any positive excess of G over 
T + fiM would indeed cause D to grow without limit. 
Sargent and Wallace simply assume that r exceeds y, and 
hence they inevitably conclude that the government 
cannot independently choose /x, G, and T. 
In contrast, my analysis proceeds here on the assump-
tion that y is greater than r. (I shall argue later in this paper 
that empirical evidence supports this assumption.) My 
basic reasoning is that the government will borrow more 
than enough to make interest payments on its debt if the 
debt-to-NNP ratio D is constant, and that this net borrow-
ing (y—r)D increases withZ).
5 As a result, higher deficits 
G — T— i±M will be associated with higher debt-to-NNP 
ratios, but these deficits can be financed indefinitely as a 
matter of arithmetic unless the real interest rate were equal 
to or greater than the growth rate of real income. 
To check that the economy will in fact move toward the 
equilibrium debt-to-income ratio, suppose that the^actual 
value of D differed from its steady-state value D. The 
growth rate of D is S — y, which is the difference in the 
growth rates ofD's numerator and denominator. Straight-
forward manipulations and the assumption of either 
perfect foresight or indexed government bonds imply the 
growth rate relation
6 
(3) S-y = (y-r)[(D~D)/D]. 
That is, the growth rate of the debt-to-income ratio will be 
positive if the actual/) is less than its steady-state value A 
andnegative if D exceeds D. So D will gradually converge 
to D even if the economy were to start from another 
position, such as that which might result from cyclical 
deficits, wars, short-run monetary or fiscal policy, or 
changes in the underlying trend values of G, T, or [i which 
define the steady-state equilibrium. 
An Example 
To illustrate that alternative monetary policies are consis-
tent with a given fiscal policy, consider the following 
simple example where 
G = 0.22 
T =0.18 
[x = 0.10/year 
M = 0.10 year 
y = 0.04/year 
r = 0.02/year. 
By substituting these values into equation (2), we can 
determine the steady-state debt-to-income ratio as follows: 
3The standard national income accounting definition of the deficit counts as 
government borrowing and private saving that portion of after-tax nominal interest 
which represents an adjustment for decline in the real value of the nominal debt. In 
those terms, we would include in equation (1) the growth rate of the nominal debt 
S + 7T and the nominal after-tax interest rate r~hn, where the inflation rate tt cancels. 
See Jump 1980 and Darby and Lothian 1983. Miller's equation (6) substitutes the 
steady-state condition that the growth rates of real NNP and real debt are equal, 
but we leave the equation in this form to analyze behavior out of full steady-state 
equilibrium. 
4 The fraction of NNP which people desire to hold as money is a decreasing 
function of the nominal interest rate and hence ju. In the relevant range, jliM 
increases with increases in ix, but not proportionately so. 
5 An alternative term for net borrowing (y — r)D would be negative debt 
service. 
6These manipulations begin with the identity 
8-y= [(r+:r)D + G — T — [xM — (y+n)D}/D 
which was obtained by taking the time derivative of the natural logarithm of D 
where the perfect foresight or indexing assumption allows us to express the nominal 
after-tax interest rate as the sum of the corresponding real interest rate and the 
actual, rather than expected, rate of inflation. (In the steady state, there is no need 
to distinguish actual from expected inflation.) Then, we have 
S - y = [(Y~r)/D] X [(G~T~i*M)/(y-r)] 
from which equation (3) follows by substitution of equation (2). 
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D = [0.22 - 0.18 - (0.10/year)(0.10 year)] 
- [(0.04/year) - (0.02/year)] 
= 0.03/(0.02/year) 
= 1.5 year. 
Suppose that the Fed decided to increase money growth 
to ju' = 0.20/year and that this induced M to fall to 
M' = 0.09 year. Then the new equilibrium debt-to-income 
ratio is 
D' = [0.22 - 0.18 - (0.20/year)(0.09 year)] 
-s- [(0.04/year) - (0.02/year)] 
= 0.022/(0.02/year) 
= 1.1 year. 
When this policy is initiated, the growth rate of the debt-to-
income ratio, using equation (3), would be 
8 - y = [(0.04/year) - (0.02/year)] 
X [(1.1 year — 1.5 year)/1.5 year] 
= -0.005 3/year. 
That is, over the first year of the new policy, the debt-to-
income ratio would fall by approximately —0.0080 year 
[by calculating (lyear) X (-0.0053/year) X (1.5 year)] 
to the new level of 1.492 year. The rate ofdecline would 
decrease asD asymptotically approachedD' = 1.1 year.
7 
Thus, the government budget constraint does not pose 
any problems for the existence or stability of the steady-
state equilibrium as money growth is varied exogenously 
with fiscal policy fixed. Similarly, either government 
spending or tax rates can be varied exogenously when the 
other fiscal variable and monetary policy are held un-
changed. In this way, the standard macroeconomic 
practice of varying fiscal or monetary instruments 
while allowing government borrowing to adjust passively 
is shown to be consistent with a stable steady-state 
equilibrium. 
Empirical Evidence Favors 
the Pleasant Arithmetic 
Like Sargent and Wallace's, my discussion thus far has 
been basically an arithmetic exercise. In this section, 
however, I argue that the empirical evidence favors the 
relevance of my assumptions for the U.S. economy. I base 
my argument upon two substantial differences between the 
respective arithmetic exercises: (1) Sargent and Wallace 
use before-tax real yields instead of after-tax real yields, 
and (2) they assume that the relevant real yield exceeds the 
growth rate of real income. 
Differences About the Relevant Real Yield 
The differences over which real yield should be compared 
to real income growth are partly semantic and partly sub-
stantive. The semantic difference depends on how an 
exogenous fiscal policy is defined. Sargent and Wallace 
define an exogenous fiscal policy as a fixed path for the 
difference between government spending and taxes (ex-
clusive of money or debt creation and interest payments) 
measured in terms of real goods. I instead hold the levels of 
each of these variables (and hence their difference) 
constant as a fraction of real income. Thus, if decreased 
money growth reduces real income, it would also reduce 
the level of the future real deficit, based on my assumption 
of constant deficits as a fraction of income. 
This difference in the way exogenous fiscal policy is 
defined is relevant only if lower money growth (and hence 
a higher debt-to-income ratio) reduces real output, as 
supposed by Sargent and Wallace. They argue that 
crowding out will occur because, in their life-cycle frame-
work, more government debt means that less wealth will be 
held in the form of capital. Thus, tax receipts on capital 
returns go down as tax receipts on government debt go 
up.
8 
Suppose instead that individuals are fully rational and 
care about their children as themselves. In that kind of 
world, government accounts are consolidated into those of 
1 Note, however, that in the absence of perfect foresight or a prior refunding 
into indexed bonds of long-term bonds (see Darby and Lothian 1983), this 
adjustment will be much faster as the real value of the existing bonds and debt 
service drops. 
8Tobin (1965) proposed a different mechanism by which inflation might 
reduce the private capital stock. In either case, as firms devote less inputs to 
conserving cash balances, improvements in the aggregate production function 
would tend to offset, eliminate, or dominate this capital stock effect, so that the 
effect of money growth on real output is theoretically ambiguous. I have assumed 
elsewhere (in Darby 1979a) that the production function effect dominates, so that 
lower inflation rates increase real output. 
17 the individuals whom it represents, so that whether the 
government finances by taxes or bonds is irrelevant to 
individual choices about consumption and the accumula-
tion of physical capital. Measured saving will equal the 
unaffected capital accumulation plus however many new 
government bonds are issued instead of tax receipts. But 
individuals will not be concerned about how many IOUs 
they are writing to themselves.
9 It should be noted that, 
given this latter view of saving behavior, the real interest 
rate is unaffected by the level of the debt-to-income ratio.
1
0 
Thus, there are good reasons to suppose that the 
difference in the ways we define exogenous fiscal policy is 
not a substantive one after all. The fall in private capital, 
which Sargent and Wallace associate with higher levels of 
the debt-to-income ratio, need not occur. Nonetheless, it 
will be shown below that even the before-tax real yield on 
government securities has been generally well below the 
growth rate of real income. In that case, even in the Sargent 
and Wallace world, exogenous variations in the deficit 
need not be monetized by the central bank. 
Real Yields Versus Real Growth 
As anyone who has ever looked at before-tax real yields on 
government securities is aware, it is a simple matter to 
show that long-term before-tax real yields have not 
approached corresponding growth rates of real output. It 
follows directly that after-tax real yields must be even less. 
This is not to suggest that the real return to capital in the 
economy is less than the growth rate of real output; but the 
real rate of return on government bonds and bills is clearly 
far below this average social return. Presumably, the 
difference between government and private returns reflects 
both nonpecuniary services and a very low correlation 
with the market return, but that really is not at issue in 
understanding the implications of the government budget 
constraint. 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1982) have compiled before-
tax real rates of return for U.S. government bonds and 
Treasury bills from 1926 to 1981. The arithmetic means 
of the yields for long-term government bonds and Treasury 
bills are 0.3 and 0.1 (geometric means: —0.1 and 0.0) 
percent per annum, respectively.
1
1
 So even if all holdings 
were tax exempt, the experience of the last 55 years sug-
gests that the after-tax real yield on government securities 
has been nowhere near the 3.0 percent per annum average 
growth rate of real income over the same years.
1
2 
It would be possible to increase the estimated real yield 
somewhat, but I have been unable to find any study that 
indicates an average real yield on government securities as 
high as 3 percent, even without any allowance for income 
taxes. Taking account of income taxes would lower these 
estimates; so there seems to be no doubt empirically that 
for the United States, the growth rate of real income 
exceeds the after-tax real yield on government securities. 
A Possible Reconciliation 
The point of this paper is a technical one: In the United 
States, dynamic inconsistencies do not result from treating 
government expenditures, taxes, and money growth as 
simultaneously exogenous. A current deficit is therefore 
not per se inflationary in the sense of requiring future 
increased money growth, as claimed by Sargent and 
Wallace. 
This conclusion would not hold for all economies, nor 
need it always hold for the United States. Suppose, for 
example, that as the ratio of goverment debt to income— 
and hence to physical capital—rises, the yield on govern-
ment debt rises toward that of physical capital instead of 
remaining constant, as assumed above and by Sargent and 
Wallace. Then, if the equilibrium debt-to-income ratio 
were to increase to the point that the after-tax real yield on 
government securities equalled or exceeded the growth 
rate of real income, the economy would cross over to the 
explosive character analyzed by Sargent and Wallace. 
While this may have occurred for other countries in the 
past, the United States does not yet seem near that point. 
To see this, first consider the fiscal 1983 deficit, 
estimated at $208 billion by the U.S. Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (1983, p. 26). If we allow for a cyclical 
component based on moving from the assumed 10.7 to 6.0 
percent unemployment rate, the structural deficit would be 
about $117.5 billion less—that is, about $90 billion. This 
amount is only $5 billion more than actual fiscal 1982 
9 White (1978), Darby (1979b), and Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) all report 
evidence that bequest assets dominate life-cycle assets in total U.S. wealth, and 
this finding supports the assumption of concern about the welfare of one's children. 
Barro (1974,1978), Kochin (1974), and David and Scadding (1974) all present 
evidence in support of the ultrarational or Ricardian view. Note that if the 
government finances a tax cut with increased borrowing, saving increases not in 
anticipation of future increased taxes but in anticipation that, otherwise, total NNP 
would fall. 
lOPlosser (1982), for example, finds that asset prices are unaffected by the 
extent to which a given level of government expenditures is financed by borrowing 
instead of taxes. 
11 The corresponding nominal yields were 3.1 and 3.1 (arithmetic) and 3.0 and 
3.0 (geometric). 
12Computed from real GNP data in Darby 1984 (Table A-20) and in FR 
Board 1983 (p. A52). 
18 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1984 
interest payments. So even without taking account of the 
large offsetting state government surpluses, there is no 
evidence of substantial differences between long-term 
government spending (exclusive of interest) and net taxes. 
Furthermore, current ratios of government debt to income 




Sargent and Wallace's propositions should not be gener-
ally applied in analyses of the U.S. economy or similar 
economies. Where the propositions are applied, they 
should be justified by evidence that the after-tax real yield 
on government bonds really does exceed the growth rate of 
real income or would do so under the circumstances being 
considered. It is hardly surprising that arithmetic alone 
cannot give a real answer to a substantive economic 
question. 
13High ex post real interest rates experienced during 1981-82 appear to be a 
result of a slowing of inflation (compare 1929-33) and not a matter of a regime 
change to unprecedentedly high deficits. 
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